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ABSTRACT
This paper deals with the relationship between inflation targeting and exchange rates. I address three
specific issues: first, I analyze the effectiveness of nominal exchange rates as shock absorbers in
countries with inflation targeting. This issue is closely related to the magnitude of the "pass-through"
coefficient. Second, I investigate whether exchange rate volatility is different in countries with an
inflation targeting regime than in countries with alternative monetary policy arrangements. And third,
I discuss whether the exchange rate should play a role in determining the monetary policy stance
under inflation targeting. An alternative way of posing this question is whether the exchange rate
should have an independent role in an open economy Taylor rule.
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I.  Introduction 
  For decades the exchange rate was at the center of macroeconomic policy debates 
in the emerging markets.  In many countries the nominal exchange rate was often used as 
a way of bringing down inflation; in other countries -- mostly in Latin America -- the 
exchange rate was used as a way of (implicitly) taxing the export sector.
1  Currency crises 
were common and were usually the result of acute (real) exchange rate overvaluation.  
During the 1990s academics and policy makers debated the merits of alternative 
exchange rate regimes for the emerging economies.  Based on credibility-based theories 
many authors argued that developing and transition countries should have hard peg 
regimes – preferably currency boards or dollarization.  One of the main arguments for 
favoring rigid exchange rate regimes was that emerging economies exhibited a “fear to 
float.”
2  After the currency crashes of the late 1990s and early 2000, however, a growing 
number of emerging economies moved away from exchange rate rigidity and adopted a 
combination of flexible exchange rates and “inflation targeting.”  Because of this move 
the exchange rate has become less central in economic policy debate in most emerging 
markets.  This, however, does not mean that the exchange rate has disappeared from 
policy discussions.  Indeed, with the adoption of inflation targeting a number of 
important exchange rate-related questions – many of them new – have emerged.  In this 
paper I address three broad policy issues related to inflation targeting (IT) and exchange 
rates that have become increasingly important in analyses on monetary policy in 
emerging countries.
3   
 
·  First, I deal with the effectiveness of the nominal exchange rate as a shock 
absorber in IT regimes.  This issue is related to the extent of the “pass- 
                                                 
1  Argentina is, possibly, the best example where, through time, the nominal exchange rate has been used in 
an effort to achieve alternative policy objectives.   For a long time during the 1960s and 1970s the real 
exchange rate was deliberately kept at an overvalued level, as a way to (implicitly) tax the agriculture 
sector (Diaz Alejandro, 1970).   In the early 1980s the exchange rate was devalued at a slow pre-defined 
rate as a way to bring down inflation – this was the so-called “tablita” episode.  During the 1990s 
Argentina had a fixed exchange rate and a currency board.  For a historical view of Argentina’s exchange 
rate policies see Della Paolera and Taylor (2003). 
2 See Calvo (1999), Calvo and Reinhart (2002). 
3 On inflation targeting see Bernanke et al (2001), Bernanke (2004), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), 
Mishkin and Jonas (2003), Mishkin and Savastano (2001), Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003), and 
Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner (2002).    2 
through” from the exchange to domestic prices.  I argue that much of the 
literature on pass through has missed the important connection between 
“pass-through” and exchange rate effectiveness as a shock absorber.   
·  Second, I analyze whether the adoption of IT has had an impact on 
exchange rate volatility.  Many authors have pointed out that since IT 
requires (some degree of) exchange rate flexibility, it necessarily results in 
higher exchange rate volatility.
4  This, however, is not a very interesting 
statement.  A more useful analysis would separate the effects of IT, on the 
one hand, and of a more flexible exchange rate regime, on the other, on 
exchange rate volatility.  This is what I do in section III of the paper.   
·  And third, I discuss whether in an inflation targeting regime the exchange 
rate should affect the monetary policy rule.  I point out that, from an 
analytical perspective, this is still an unresolved issue.  At the policy level, 
very few IT central banks openly recognize using the exchange rate as a 
(separate) term in their policy rules (i.e. Taylor rules).   However, existing 
empirical evidence suggests that almost every central bank does take 
exchange rate behavior into account when undertaken monetary policy.
5 
 
Much has been written about these three topics.  And yet, there continue to be 
unresolved policy issues surrounding all of them.  In this paper I take a new look at these 
issues, and I argue that recent policy debates have missed some of the finer aspects of 
these problems.  In Sections II and III, on pass-through and volatility, I perform 
comparative empirical analyses for a group of 7 countries – two advanced and five 
emerging – that have adopted inflation targeting.
6  In Section IV, on the other hand, I 
discuss the possible role of the exchange rate in determining the monetary policy stance 
in an IT system.  Section V is the conclusions.   
 
                                                 
4  See Mishkin and Savastano (2001) for a discussion on the requirements for an IT regime to work. 
5  See the discussion in Section IV. 
6  These countries were selected for two reasons:  first, I am interested in having countries representing 
different regions and different stages of development.  Second, I need fairly long time series in order to 
perform the empirical analysis.   3 
II.  The Effectiveness of the Nominal Exchange Rate as a Shock Absorber in 
Inflation Targeting Regimes:  An Analysis of Pass-Through in IT 
Countries  
For many years economists have been concerned with the effectiveness of 
nominal exchange rate changes as shock absorbers.  This issue has been related with the 
traditional rejection of “structuralists” to devaluations, and with the historical skepticism 
regarding the benefits of flexible exchange rates.  From a policy point of view this issue 
can be decomposed in three questions: (a) what are the effects of nominal exchange rate 
changes on the real exchange rate? (b) What are the effects of real exchange rate changes 
on the external position of a country?  And (c) what are the collateral effects of nominal 
exchange rate changes on balance sheets and aggregate economic activity.   
In this section I deal with the first issue – the effects of nominal exchange rate 
changes on real exchange rates – in inflation targeting regimes.  This question is directly 
related to the issue of the “pass-through” from exchange rates to domestic prices, an issue 
that have been discussed in great detail in the last few years.  Much of the recent 
literature on pass-through, however, has ignored this “exchange rate effectiveness” 
question, and has focused on the inflationary effects of exchange rate changes.  If the 
inflationary effects of exchange rate changes are large, the authorities will have to 
implement monetary and fiscal policies that offset the inflationary consequences of 
exchange rate changes.  Historically, pass-through has tended to be large in emerging 
countries and, in particular, in countries that experience a currency crises.  Borensztein 
and De Gregorio (1999), for example, used a 41 countries sample and found that after 
one year 30% of a nominal devaluation has been passed through to inflation; after two 
years the pass-through was a very high 60% on average.  They also found that the degree 
of pass-through was significantly smaller in advanced countries.     
A number of recent papers have shown that the degree of pass-through has 
declined substantially since the 1990s; particularly telling examples are the UK and 
Sweden after their currency crises in the early 1990s, and Brazil after the 1999 
devaluation of the real.  In an influential paper Taylor (2000) has argued that this lower 
pass-through has been the result of a decline in the level and volatility of inflation.  
According to him, one of the positive consequences of a strong commitment towards   4 
price stability is that the extent of pass-through declines significantly, and a virtuous 
circle of sorts develops: lower inflation reduces pass-through, and this, in turn, helps 
maintain low inflation.  Campa and Goldberg (2002) used data on domestic prices of 
imports for OECD countries to test Taylor’s proposition; their results suggest that 
monetary conditions are only mildly related to the degree of pass-through.  More 
recently, Gagnon and Ihrig (2004) have used a sample of advanced nations to analyze this 
issue, and have concluded that the decline in the pass-through has been related to changes 
in monetary policy procedures and, in particular, to the adoption of inflation targeting. 
II.1 Two Notions of Pass Through   
Most authors have argued – either implicitly or explicitly – that a decline in the 
degree of pass-through is a positive development; after all, a lower pass-through will 
result in a decline in inflationary pressures coming from abroad.  A limitation of this 
inflation-centered view, however, is that it is too simplistic and tends to ignore the role of 
relative prices, an in particular the fundamental role played by the real exchange rate.
7   
Once relative prices are introduced into the analysis, it is clear that the “pass-
through problem” does not only affect inflation; it is also related to the effectiveness of 
the nominal exchange rate as a shock absorber.  In this context, it is important to make a 
distinction between the pass-through of exchange rate changes into the price of 
nontradabales and into the domestic price of tradables.  While a high pass through for 
nontradables will reduce the effectiveness of the nominal exchange rate, a high pass 
through for tradables will enhance its effectiveness.   
To illustrate this point, consider the standard definition of the real exchange rate 
r as the (domestic) relative price of tradable to non-tradable goods: 
 





= r , 
 
                                                 
7  Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2005) analyze the effectiveness of alternative exchange rate regimes to 
accommodate external shocks.  In order for the exchange rate to act as a shock absorber, it is necessary for 
nominal changes in the nominal exchange rate to be translated into real exchange rate changes.  See also 
Hochreiter and Siklos (2002).   5 
where  T P  is the domestic price of tradables and  N P is the price of nontradables.  For the 
nominal exchange rate to be an effective shock absorber – either under an adjustable or 
under a flexible exchange rate regime –, a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate (E) 
will have to generate an increase inr ; if this happens, the change in r will help generate 
an expenditure switching effect.  In traditional models this result is assured by three 
assumptions: (1) the “law of one price” holds for tradables;
8 (2)  N P is the result of the 
clearing conditions in the nontradables market; and (3) economic authorities pursue 
‘tight” monetary and fiscal policies and nominal wages do not adjust automatically as a 
result of the nominal depreciation..  The first two assumptions are summarized in 
equations (2a) and (2b): 
 
(2a)   
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Where E is the nominal exchange rate (an increase in E is a nominal depreciation), 
*
T P is 
the international price of tradables;  W N N
D S , ,  and  A are the supply and demand for 
nontradables, nominal wages and absorption.  Absorption, in turn, is affected by fiscal 
policy and monetary policy; both expansive fiscal and monetary will result in a higher A. 
In this setting, and assuming that the international price of tradables does not change: 
 







































= and  0 , 0 , 0 ³ £ ³ f e h  are elasticities.  
According to the traditional monetary model, the pass-through from the exchange rate to 
the domestic price of tradables will be unitary, and the pass-through to the domestic price 
of nontradables will depend on wage rate behavior and absorption policies.  Under the 
                                                 
8  This assumption is often referred to as “producer-currency pricing.”   6 
classical case,  0 log log = = A d W d , and the pass-through to  N P will be equal to 0 < 
) 1 ( 1 a - £ 1.  In this case, a nominal depreciation will result in a real exchange rate 





>0 --, and the nominal exchange rate will play a role as a 
shock absorber.   
There is no need, however, for the assumptions of the traditional monetarist 
model to hold in the real world.  Indeed, it is possible to show that if there is an automatic 
backward looking wage indexation mechanism, the pass-through to the price of 






.  Moreover, as shown in Edwards 
(1998), if the monetary authorities have low credibility and labor unions expect 





>0, the effectiveness of the nominal 
exchange rate as a shock absorber will decline.   
  A number of analysts have questioned the validity of the law of one price for 
tradables (equation 2a), even in small economies.  If export firms have some 
monopolistic power, they will set prices in a way that maximize profits.  In this case, they 
will “price to market” and will not alter their domestic prices in a particular market in 
proportion to exchange rate changes (see Atkenson and Burstein 2005, for a recent survey 
and results).  The easiest way to visualize this is to consider the optimal pricing strategy 
for a monopoly operating in country j.   In this case, instead of equation (2a) for the 
domestic price of tradables, we have (2c): 
 
(2c)    .
j j
T MC P m =  
 
m  is the markup; MC is the marginal cost of operating in country j (in domestic 
currency) and will depend on production costs, the cost of transportation and distribution 
costs.  The markup, will depend on the price elasticity of demand for T in country j (J ) 







, where J <0.   The elasticity, in turn, will depend on a number 
of variables, including income growth and the degree of price instability in the economy.    7 
It is clear from (2c) that under most circumstances a change in the nominal exchange rate 
will not be translated into a one-to-one change in the domestic price of tradables.  This is 
for two reasons: first, MC needs not remain constant when E changes.  And second, the 
mark-up will not remain unchanged when the exchange rate depreciates; indeed, it is 
likely to decline.
9   This means that the magnitude of the pass-through from exchange rate 
to the price of tradables is likely to be smaller than one.  In the extreme case when the 
pass-through into importable goods is zero we say that the market is characterized by 
“local currency pricing.”   
Although the framework developed here could be made more complex – by 
assuming that nontradables use tradable inputs, for example --, the main points would 
still be valid.  In particular, once the role of the real exchange rate is explicitly introduced 
into the analysis, it is important to distinguish between two notions of exchange rate pass-
through:  pass-through into nontradables, and pass-through into tradables.  In this 
context, and from a policy perspective, a desirable situation is one where pass-through 
coefficients for tradables and nontradables are low and different, with the pass through 
for tradable goods being higher than that for nontradables. 
In this section I use data from seven countries that have adopted inflation 
targeting to investigate whether the magnitude of the pass-through has been affected by 
the adoption of this monetary policy; see Table 1 for a list of countries and the date when 
IT was enacted.  One of the main objectives of this analysis is to investigate whether the 
adoption of IT has affected the effectiveness of nominal exchange rates as shock 
absorbers.  As pointed out above, this would be the case if the pass-through from 
exchange rates to nontradable prices has declined and/or the pass-through to tradables 
goods has increased (or, at least, has not declined).          
II.2 Empirical Model 
  An empirical analysis of the pass-through that focuses on inflation and the real 
exchange rate would consider the way in which changes in nominal exchange rates affect 
the domestic prices of nontradable and tradable goods.  In most countries, however, there 
are important data limitations; in particular, very few countries have data on nontradables 
prices.  Data limitations are more severe in emerging countries, where long series of 
                                                 
9 This is the case under many forms of the demand curve.   8 
domestic prices of importables are rarely available.
10  For this reason, in the empirical 
analysis that follows I have used the CPI index as a proxy for the domestic price of 
nontradables ( N P ) and the PPI as a proxy for the domestic price of tradables ( T P ).  This 








 as a proxy for the real exchange rate in equation 
(1).  As it turns out, and as is illustrated in Figure 1 for the case of Chile, in many 
countries this is a fairly good proxy for the (effective) real exchange rate. 
  Most empirical studies on pass-through have estimated variants of the following 
equation (Campa and Goldberg 2002; Gagnon and Ihrig 2004): 
 
(4)    t t t it i t t P P x E P w b b b b b + D + D + + D + = D - ￿ 1 4
*
3 2 1 0 log log log log  . 
 
Where  t P is a price index -- either of importables, tradables or nontradables --, E is the 
nominal exchange rate,  * P is the an index of foreign prices, the  s b are parameters to be 
estimated, the  s x j are other controls expected to capture changes in the markup, and  j w  
is an error term with standard characteristics. The short run pass-through is given by  1 b  
and the long term pass-through is 






11  Many analysts have imposed the 
constraint 3 1 b b = .  In this paper, however, I consider the more general case, and I allow 
for different coefficients for the nominal exchange rate and international prices.
12   
From an empirical point of view the question of interest is whether the 
coefficients  1 b and  4 b have experienced a structural change at (approximately) the time 
of the adoption of inflation targeting.  I investigate this by adding two interactive terms to 
equation (4).  The equation that I actually estimated is: 
 
                                                 
10 In the IFS, unit import prices for industrialized countries are expressed in domestic currency.  However, 
for most emerging countries they are expressed in US dollars. 
11  Campa and Goldberg (2002) used the sum of four lagged coefficients of the change in the exchange rate 
to compute the long run pass-through.  The distributed-lags approach used by Campa and Goldberg is also 
followed by most other authors.   
12 Some studies, such as Gagnon and Ihring (2004), have analyzed how different monetary regimes have 
affected the extent of pass-through.   9 
(4a)   
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Where DIT is a dummy variable that takes the value of one at (approximately) the time IT 
is adopted, and zero otherwise.  The short term pass-through in the post-IT period is 
5 1 b b + .   Notice that, in contrast with other studies, in (4a) I allow the coefficient of 
lagged  P log D during the post-IT period to be different from the pre-IT coefficient.  This 
is important for two reasons: first, it allows investigating whether, as argued by Taylor 
(2000), a more inflationary-focused policy reduces inflationary inertia.  Second, it 
provides an alternative channel through which the long run pass-through may decline.  












, it may 
be lower than the pre-IT coefficient either because  5 b  or  6 b are significantly negative in 
equation (4a). 
In spite of its simplicity, the estimation of equations of the type of (4a) presents 
several challenges.  The most important has to do with potential endogeneity problems.  
Indeed, it is possible that  E log D in equation (4a) is not exogenous, and is correlated with 
the error term.  In principle, there are several ways to deal with this issue; none of them, 
however, is particular satisfactory from a practical point of view.  First, equation (4a) 
could be estimated using simultaneous equations methods, such as two stage least squares 
or generalized method of moments.  The problem is that, as is well known, in the vast 
majority of countries with floating exchange rates it is very difficult to find good 
instruments for E log D ; most exogenous variables are not highly correlated with changes 
in the nominal exchange rate.
13   Second, structural VARs could be estimated.  However, 
identification conditions require making assumptions about the timing of the effects of 
exchange rate on prices that are not particularly convincing.  For these reasons, most 
recent studies on pass through, including Campa and Goldberg (2002) and Gagnon and 
Ihrig (2004) have relied on least squares methods.  An additional challenge in the 
                                                 
13 This difficulty was first pointed out by Meese and Rogoff (1983).   10 
estimation of (4a) is that many countries don’t have data on the (possible) determinant of 
the markup, or additional controls x in equation (4a). 
II.3 Data and Empirical Results 
  In the estimation of equation (4a) I use quarterly data for the period 1985-2005 for 
seven countries – two advanced and five emerging – that have adopted inflation targeting 
at some point during the last 15 years (see Table 1).
14  Some of these countries – Chile is 
the premier example – adopted IT in an evolutionary fashion.  For this reason, in Table 1 
I provide two dates for the adoption of IT in Chile: 1991, when an inflation target range 
was first announced, and 1994 when a specific inflation rate was adopted as a target .
15  
Unless I indicate otherwise, the results reported in this section were obtained when the 
mid 1994 date was used as the launching date of IT in Chile.  When the alternative 
1991date was used, the results obtained were similar. 
For each country I estimated two equations:  one for the rate of change of the CPI 
(which, as mentioned, is a proxy for nontradables inflation), and one for the rate of 
change of the PPI (a proxy for domestic tradables inflation).  All data are expressed as 
quarterly percentage changes.  The exchange rate is the effective (multilateral) exchange 
rate, defined as the domestic price of a basket of currencies.  Thus, an increase in E is a 
(multilateral) nominal depreciation.
16  To the extent that it takes some time for a new 
policy regime to be understood by the public, we would expect that the structural change 
in the pass-through coefficients would not be instantaneous; it is likely to take place some 
quarters after the new policy is adopted.  In the estimation of (4a) I considered alternative 
lags for DIT; most of the results reported in Table 2 are for four lags.  The rate of change 
of the US producer price index was used as a proxy for world inflation.  In the basic 
results reported in Table 2, I follow Gagnon and Ihrig (2004) and I do not include 
additional controlsx.  See, however, the discussion below. 
  Since, for each country, the errors in the CPI and PPI equations are likely to be 
correlated, I estimated the two equations for each country simultaneously, using Zellner’s 
                                                 
14 In some countries the time period was slightly shorter.   
15  Alternatively one could use March 2000, when a Monetary Report was first published, as the relevant 
date.   
16 For the majority of countries the multilateral effective exchange rate was taken from the IFS.  For those 
countries for which the IFS does not provide the effective rate, I constructed a multilateral exchange rate 
index.   11 
seemingly unrelated regressions (SURE) procedure.
17  The results obtained are presented 
in Table 2.  In Table 3, on the other hand, I present a summary of the pass-through 
coefficients in the pre-inflation targeting and post-inflation targeting periods.  The main 
results obtained may be summarized as follows: 
·  In all countries the pre-IT short term pass-through coefficient in the CPI 
equation is positive.  It is significantly so in six out of the seven countries; 
the only exception is Canada whose coefficient is positive but not 
significant.
18  However, the estimated coefficients show a significant 
degree of variability across countries.  The short-run, pre-IT pass-through 
coefficient into nontradable prices (CPI) ranges from a low of 0.020 in 
Korea, to a very high 0.719 in Brazil.  A simple inspection at these 
estimates suggests that, historically, the CPI pass-through coefficient has 
been much higher in countries with a tradition of high and chronic 
inflation (e.g. Brazil), than in countries with traditional price stability (e.g. 
Korea).  
·  Also, in six out of the seven countries the short term pass-through 
coefficient in the PPI (or tradables) equation is significantly positive.  
There is also a significant variability across countries. 
·  For the pre-IT period, the point estimate of the short term pass-through 
coefficient is higher for tradables (PPI) than for nontradables (CPI) in all 
countries.   
·  In most countries, and during the pre-IT period, the long-run point 
estimate for the PPI pass-through is higher than for the CPI pass-through.   
·  In every case, the estimated coefficient of ( ) DIT E d ´ log  is negative.  It 
is significantly so in the majority of cases.  This indicates that the short 
run pass-through has declined in every country in the sample in the post-
IT period.  Moreover, in most cases the decline has been larger in the CPI 
(or nontradable) equation than in the PPI equation, indicating that there 
                                                 
17   In all equations I also included a time trend and, in the case of Brazil, two dummy variables for the 
1989 and 1999 currency crises. 
18  In the analysis that follows I consider as “significant” coefficients with a p-value of 20% or lower.  In 
the majority of cases, however, the p-values are smaller than 5%.     12 
has been an increase in the short run effectiveness of the nominal 
exchange rate.   
·  The decline in the short run CPI pass-through in the post-IT period has 
been particularly dramatic in the case of Brazil, where the short run 
coefficient declined from 0.719 to 0.056.  Other cases of major reduction 
in the pass-through coefficient are Chile, Israel and Mexico.  At the other 
extreme, the change in the degree of CPI (or nontradable) pass-through in 
Korea is not statistically significant; in this country the CPI pass-through 
was already very low (0.020). 
·  The estimates in Table 2 show that in the pre-IT period inflation was 
characterized by a considerable degree of inertia in most countries – 
measured by the coefficient of lagged  P log D .  Notice, however, that in 
most cases, inertia was higher for CPI (or nontradable) inflation than for 
PPI (or tradables) inflation.   
·  The estimated coefficients of ( ) DIT P ´ D -1 log  are negative in the vast 
majority of the countries – the exceptions are Brazil for both definitions of 
inflation, and Israel for CPI.  The estimated coefficient for 
( ) DIT P ´ D -1 log  is negative and statistically significant for Australia 
(CPI), Canada (CPI), and Mexico (CPI and PPI), indicating that in those 
countries inflationary inertia has significantly declined in the post-IT 
period. 
·  The post-IT long run pass-through depends both on the behavior of 
( ) DIT P ´ D -1 log  and ( ) DIT E´ log .  As Table 3 shows, for the majority 
of countries in the sample the long run pass through coefficient has 
declined in the post-IT period.  This is the case both for the CPI (or 
nontradable) and for the PPI (or tradable) pass-through coefficients.   
 
An interesting question is whether the differences in the pass-through coefficients 
for the CPI (nontradable) and PPI (tradable) equations reported in Tables 2 and 3 are 
statistically significant.  In order to address this issue I computed Wald 
2 c statistics to   13 
test for cross equation restrictions.  The results obtained are reported in Table 4 (p-values 
in parentheses).  The test statistics are 
2 c with one degree of freedom, and the null 
hypothesis is that the pass-through coefficients in the CPI and PPI equations are equal in 
each country.  As may be seen, the null hypothesis is rejected at conventional levels in 4 
of the seven countries.
19 A particularly interesting case is that of Brazil, where the null 
hypothesis was rejected both in the short and long run in the pre-IT period, and is only 
rejected in the short run in the post-IT period.  As a way of gaining further insights, I also 
tested the joint hypothesis that the short and long run pass-through coefficients were 
equal in both the pre and post-IT periods.  The results – available on request – indicate 
that the null hypothesis is rejected for Brazil, Canada and Mexico.   
In the estimates reported in Table 2 I included a small number of controls.  In 
order to check for the robustness of the results – and, in particular, to check for possible 
omitted variables bias – I also estimated equation (4a) including the following controls: 
(a) deviations of GDP from a stochastic trend, lagged one or two periods (In some 
regressions this variable was also interacted with the nominal depreciation); (b) 
deviations of US GSP, lagged one and two periods; (c) the change in the degree of 
volatility of inflation, lagged one or two periods.  (In some regressions this variable was 
also interacted with the nominal depreciation); and (d) a time trend.  The results obtained 
are very similar to those presented in Table 2 and confirm that in most countries there 
have been breakpoints in the short run pass-through, the degree of inertia and the long 
ruin pass-through coefficient.
20  
II.4 Further Results and Comments on Chile’s Experience 
  Chile has been a pioneering in the implementation of inflation targeting in 
emerging countries.  What makes this case particularly interesting is that for decades 
Chile had a high and chronic inflation.  Starting in the 1940s inflation increased 
significantly and became a major political and economic problem; until the 1990s 
repeated efforts to quell it proved to be unsuccessful (Meller 1996).  In his celebrated 
work on inflationary inertia, Pazos (1972) referred to Chile as the premier case of an 
economy where inflation tended to perpetuate itself.  Numerous scholars have analyzed 
                                                 
19  Although in most of them the rejection is not across all time-runs and time periods. 
20  Results available on request.   14 
the historical behavior of inflation in Chile, and have concluded that fiscal largesse, low 
Central Bank credibility, and widespread indexation practices (both for wages and the 
nominal exchange rate) were behind Chile’s historical high rates of inflation.  In the 
1990’s, however, there were important changes in Chile’s monetary policy: the Central 
bank was granted independence and it formally adopted an inflation targeting approach 
(Corbo 1998, Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia (2002), and Morandé (2002)).  Since then 
inflation has declined significantly.  During the last few years it has not been significantly 
different from world inflation.  
The results presented in Tables 2 and 3 of this paper tend to confirm this story: 
after the adoption of inflation targeting in the early 1990s Chile experienced a decline in 
the degree of pass-through, both in the case of CPI inflation as well as PPI inflation (See-
also De Gregorio and Tokman, 2004).  In this section I provide additional results on 
Chile’s case that provide further light on the relation between inflation and exchange 
rates.  In Table 5 I present new estimates for equation (4a) for CPI (or nontradable) 
inflation and CPI (or tradable) inflation using three stages least squares, which deals with 
the potential endogeneity of exchange rate changes.
21  As may be seen, although the point 
estimates are somewhat different, the overall results tend to confirm the conclusions 
reached above.  Generally speaking, the 3SLS estimations show that the degree of both 
CPI and PPI pass-through has declined in the post-IT period.  Interestingly, and in 
contrast with the cases of Australia, Canada and Mexico, there is no evidence of a decline 
of the degree of inflationary inertia in Chile in the post-IT period.  Moreover, in Chile the 
level of inertia is similar for CPI and PPI inflation.  From a comparative perspective, 
however, inflationary inertia in Chile is not higher than in countries with a long tradition 
of price stability, such as Australia and Canada (See Table 2). 
 
III.  Inflation Targeting and Exchange Rate Volatility:  Some Empirical Tests 
As a number of authors have pointed out, a floating exchange rate system is a 
requirement for a well functioning inflation targeting regime (Mishkin and Savastano 
                                                 
21 The following instruments were used: lagged first-difference in the US CPI, commodity price index, and 
first-difference of the US PPI.   15 
2001).
22  The reason for this is that in a world of capital mobility, independent monetary 
policy cannot coexist with a pegged exchange rate regime – this is the so-called 
“Impossibility of the Holy Trinity.”  This connection between inflation targeting and 
floating exchange rates has led some analysts to argue that one of the costs of IT is the 
increase in exchange rate volatility.  In a recent paper, De Gregorio, Tokman and Valdés 
(2005) discuss this issue in the Chilean context, and show that in Chile (nominal) 
exchange rate volatility has not been higher than in other countries with floating 
exchange rates. 
The way in which the adoption of IT affects exchange rate volatility is an 
important policy issue.  Yet, it is one that has not been dealt with appropriately in recent 
debates.  Indeed, many analysts have compared exchange rate volatility under IT with 
volatility under a pegged or administered exchange rate regime.  This is not an adequate 
comparison.  From a policy evaluation perspective it is important to separate the issue of 
the selection of the exchange rate regime with the adoption of IT. The correct question is 
whether the adoption of IT increases exchange rate volatility, controlling for the 
exchange rate regime.  Moreover, most volatility analyses have been based on 
comparisons of unconditional volatility measures across countries, or across time for the 
same country.   
There are several possible ways of addressing these issues.  First, one can analyze 
whether the adoption of IT affects conditional exchange rate volatility in countries that 
have had a floating exchange rate for a prolonged period of time, such as Australia and 
Canada.  Second, regressions that control for the exchange rate regime can be estimated.  
In this section I use both of these approaches and monthly data to analyze this issue.  The 
analysis focuses on the seven countries in Table 1.  From a conceptual perspective, once 
one conditions for the exchange rate regime, it is possible to determine whether IT, by 
itself, results in an increase in exchange rate volatility.  For example, in the cases of 
Australia and Canada – two countries with a long tradition with floating rates -- a 
comparison of conditional volatility before and after the implementation of IT will 
provide information on the effects of the new policy regime on exchange rate behavior.   
                                                 
22  There is no need, however, for the authorities to abstain completely from intervention in the foreign 
exchange market.  See the discussion in Section IV of this paper.   16 
III.1 The Data and the Empirical Model 
In Figure 2 I present data on exchange rate volatility, measured as the monthly 
difference in the log of the nominal effective exchange rate for the countries in my 
sample for 1988:01-2005:01.  These figures capture clearly the degree of instability – 
including the crises -- faced by some of the countries in the sample during the period 
under study.  This figure also shows that in most of the countries instability has 
experienced important changes. 
The changing degree of exchange rate volatility displayed in Figure 2 suggests 
that, during this period, exchange rate volatility can be explained by models in the 
generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic (GARCH) tradition.  Most 
GARCH-based empirical work on exchange rate volatility has tended to ignore, both in 
the mean and conditional variance equations, the potential role of alternative monetary 
regimes.  Consider the following GARCH model of nominal exchange rates in a 
particular country:  
  
(5)    ￿ + + = D - t j t j t z E y f q log  





Where, as before, E is the nominal effective exchange rate; the  s z'are variables that 
affect changes in the exchange rate, and may include lagged values of E log D , as well as 
other domestic or international variables;  t y are innovations to exchange rate changes, 
with zero mean and conditional variance 
2
t s .  The  t y , in equation (6), are variables, 
other than past squared innovations or lagged forecast variance, that help explain 
exchange rate volatility.  
  In this section I report results obtained from the estimation of models based on 
equations (5) and (6) using monthly data for the countries in Table 1.  The time period is 
1988:01 through 2005:01, with the exception of Brazil where I analyze the period 
1994:06-2005:01.
23  My main interest is to investigate whether the adoption of an IT 
                                                 
23  Approximately in mid-1994, when the real plan was adopted, inflation in Brazil experienced a structural 
break.   17 
operating procedure for monetary policy has affected exchange rate volatility.  In 
addition, I am interested in understanding whether the adoption of a floating exchange 
rate regime had an effect on volatility.  For this reason, I included two dummy variables 
as  t y in the conditional variance equation (6): DIT , which as before takes the value of 
one if the country has implemented an IT regime, and FLOAT , which takes the value of 
one if the country has a floating exchange rate regime.  In creating the variable FLOAT  I 
used information from a number of sources, including Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2003), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and the IMF.  In the means equation (5) I also 
included a time trend and, for the cases of Mexico and Korea dummy variables for their 
major currency crises.
24 
III.2 Results   
In the first step of the analysis I estimated, by ordinary least squares, a number of 
versions of equation (5) for the seven countries in the sample.
25  The analysis of the 
residuals clearly showed the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity.  Engle’s LM test 
rejected the null hypothesis of absence of ARCH for every country.  In the second step I 
identified the order of the GARCH process for each of the countries, and I verified 
stability.  Finally, I estimated the system (5) and (6); in all cases the dummy variables for 
inflation targeting (DIT ) and for floating regime (FLOAT ) were lagged one period; the 
results, however, are not affected in a significant way when alternative lag structures are 
used (including no lags).  If the adoption of inflation targeting has indeed resulted in 
increased nominal effective exchange rate instability, as some critics have argued, the 
estimated coefficient of DIT would be significantly positive.  If floating rates increase 
exchange rate volatility, as one would expect under most circumstances, the estimated 
coefficient ofFLOAT  would be significantly positive.  In the estimation of the 
conditional variance equations for Australia and Canada I did not include theFLOAT  
variable.  The reason for this is that both of these countries have had a floating regime 
since the mid 1970s. 
                                                 
24  In some of the estimates I also included in the means equation the floating regime dummy.  Its inclusion 
does not affect the results, however.  
25  As is customary, a preliminary step consists of analyzing stationarity.  I used both country-specific and 
panel techniques.   18 
The results obtained are in Table 6.  I have only reported the order of the GARCH 
process, and the estimated coefficients of DIT andFLOAT .  The main results may be 
summarized as follows: 
·  The estimated coefficient of the inflation targeting dummy DIT is positive 
and very small in three of the countries – Australia, Canada, and Korea.  
However, in none of these cases it is significantly different from zero.  
This indicates that (at least in this sample) there is no evidence that the 
adoption of IT increases nominal multilateral exchange rate volatility. 
·  The estimated coefficient of the inflation targeting dummy DIT is 
significantly negative in three of the countries in the sample – Brazil, 
Chile (for both equations), and Israel –, and negative (but not significant) 
in Mexico.  In the case of Chile, the degree of significance of DIT is 
higher (in absolute terms) when 1994 is considered as the beginning of the 
IT period.  Interestingly, when the FLOAT  variable is excluded, the 
coefficient of DIT becomes positive (but insignificant) in the conditional 
variance equations for Chile and Brazil.  These results suggest that, after 
controlling for the exchange rate regime, the adoption of IT has tended to 
reduce conditional volatility in some countries.  The most likely reason for 
this is that IT is a transparent and predictable monetary framework that 
tends to reduce unexpected shocks or “news.”  
·  The estimated coefficient of theFLOAT  variable is positive in the five 
equations where it was included.  Moreover, it is significantly positive in 
three of the five equations – for Brazil, Chile, and Israel.   
 
The results reported in Table 6 are for standard GARCH models.  In this setting 
the nominal exchange rate reacts in the same way to positive and negative shocks.   
However, as a number of authors have argued, it is possible that the nominal exchange 
rate reacts in an asymmetric fashion to positive and negative shocks.  In order to analyze 
whether this possibility would affect the main results discussed above I estimated a series 
of TGARCH and EGARCH models for the seven countries in the sample.  Although 
there is some evidence of asymmetric responses, the main conclusions on the coefficients   19 
of DIT and FLOAT  discussed above still hold:  there is no evidence that, once one 
controls for exchange rate regime, the volatility of nominal (multilateral) exchange rates 
increased with the adoption of IT. 
The results presented above are for nominal multilateral exchange rates.  An 
interesting question is whether the adoption of IT has affected real effective exchange 
rate volatility.  In order to analyze this issue I estimated equations of the type of (5) and 
(6) for the four countries with data on real effective exchange rates at the monthly 
frequency – Australia, Canada, Chile and Israel.  The results obtained are presented in 
Table 7.  As may be seen, they tend to confirm those obtained for nominal multilateral 
exchange rate volatility.  There is no evidence that the adoption of IT has increased real 
effective exchange rate volatility.  In fact, there is some evidence that the opposite has 
happened in Chile and Israel; in both of these countries the coefficient of DIT is negative, 
with a Z-statistic in excess (in absolute terms) of 1.2.  As in Table 6, these estimates 
suggest that the adoption of a floating regime increased RER volatility:  the estimated 
coefficients of the FLOAT dummy are significantly positive. 
III.3 Extensions for the Case of Chile    
  The results reported above span a period where most – but not all – of the 
countries in the sample experienced important changes in their exchange rate regime.  
Chile is a case in point.
26  During this period the country went from having an exchange 
rate band of varying width to having a flexible exchange rate.  It may be argued, thus, 
that the extent of exchange rate volatility during the band period was limited by the 
existence of the band itself, even if the actual exchange rate never hit the bands.  If this is 
the case, the results for the emerging countries – but not for Australia or Canada – in 
Table 6 maybe misleading.  In order to deal with this issue in this section I use data on 
Chile’s shadow nominal exchange rate – or exchange rate that would have prevailed in 
the absence of the bands – to analyze exchange rate volatility in the period 1991-2004.  
The data on the shadow exchange rate were taken from Edwards and Rigobon (2005).  
This shadow rate was computed using an iterative procedure based on the behavior of the 
actual rate, the bands and the fundamentals.  Figure 3 presents the evolution of the 
                                                 
26  This also applies to Mexico and Israel.  Mexico had a band until late 1994; Israel had a widening 
crawling band into the 2000s.  Korea had a managed exchange rate until 1998; Brazil had a managed rate 
until 1999.      20 
monthly change of the nominal observed and nominal shadow exchange rate for the 
Chilean peso relative to the U.S. dollar 
  The estimation of the conditional variance equation for the shadow exchange rate 
yielded the following results: the point estimate for the inflation targeting dummy 
DIT was -2.36E-05, with a z-statistic of -0.406.  The point estimate for the floating 
exchange rate dummy FLOAT  was 0.00004, with a z-statistic of 1.62.
27  These results, 
then, confirm those reported in the preceding subsection.  Even when a shadow exchange 
rate is used, there is no evidence suggesting that the adoption of IT increased nominal 
exchange rate volatility; there is, on the other hand, some evidence indicating that the 
move from a band to a floating regime did have a small (positive effect) on volatility.  
 
IV.  Central Bank Policy and the Exchange Rate under an IT Policy Regime  
Should inflation targeting central banks intervene in the foreign exchange market?  
And if so, how should this intervention take place?  Should it be sterilized intervention, 
where the resulting changes in monetary aggregates are sterilized through operations 
involving domestic securities?  Or should it be non-sterilized intervention, where 
monetary aggregates are affected?
28  These are complex questions that have moved to the 
center of the policy debate in many IT countries, especially in Latin America.  In this 
section I discuss the issue of whether IT central banks should explicitly consider the 
exchange rate in their monetary rule.
29  This question is related to a number of important 
(and controversial) policy issues, including the costs of (real) exchange rate misalignment 





                                                 
27  In this estimation the  1994 DIT dummy was used.   
28  Questions do not end here, however.  Here are some additional ones:  If intervention is sterilized, what 
type of domestic securities should be used in the sterilization?  Should the purchases/sales of forex be done 
in the spot or in the forward market?   
29   It is not my intention to provide a comprehensive survey on the topic of central bank intervention.  The 
literature is voluminous country-specific, and continues to grow every day; interested readers are directed 
to, among others, Dominguez and Frankel (1993), Taylor (2004), Kearns and Rigobon (2005), Neely 
(2001), Sarno and Taylor (2001).  For an excellent analysis of different central bank policies, including 
Chile’s case, see Tapia and Tokman (2004). 
30   On fear of floating see Calvo and Reinhart (2002).   21 
IV.2 The Issues 
From a technical point of view the discussion of the relation between central bank 
policy and the exchange rate may be framed in terms of the form of the Taylor rule in a 
small open economy. Taylor himself has posed the problem as follows  
 
“How should the instruments of monetary policy (the interest rate or a 
monetary aggregate) react to the exchange rate?”  (Taylor, 2001, p. 263. 
Emphasis added)  
 
In order to address this question more formally, consider the following equation:
31 
 
(7)    1 1 0 - + + + = t t t t t e h e h gy f i p  
 
Where  t i  is the short term interest rate used by the central bank as a policy tool,  t p is the 
deviation of the rate of inflation from its target level – possibly zero --,  t y is the deviation 
of real GDP from potential real GDP (often called the output gap), and e t is the log of the 
real exchange rate in year t.
32   f and  g are the traditional Taylor rule coefficients;  0 h and 
1 h are the coefficients of the current and lagged log of the real exchange rates in the 
expanded Taylor rule, and are the main interest of this discussion.  If   0 1 0 = = h h  
exchange rate developments should not be incorporated in the policy rule, and the Taylor 
rule reverts to its traditional form. 
It is conceivable, in principle, that in a small open economy the optimal monetary 
policy rule – that is the policy that maximizes the authorities’ objective function – is one 
where both  0 h and  1 h  are different from zero.  Interestingly, if  0 0 > h  and 1 0 h h - = , then 
the rule implies that monetary policy should react to changes in the (real) exchange rate.  
Notice that the formulation in equation (7) does not imply, even when  0 h and  1 h  are 
different from zero, that the monetary authorities should defend a certain level of the 
exchange rate.  If the optimal policy calls for intervention – that is for  0 h and  1 h different 
                                                 
31   This is the precise equation presented by Taylor in his discussion on the subject. 
32   In this formulation an increase in e denotes a real exchange rate appreciation.   22 
than zero --, and if the monetary authorities do follow this policy, a casual observer may 
conclude that the country in question is subject to “fear of floating.”  This, however, 
would be an incorrect inference, as the country in question would be practicing “optimal 
flotation.” 
  In order to answer fully this question it is necessary to specify the policy maker’s 
objective (or loss) function, and the model that best captures the functioning of the 
economy.  Most authors assume that the goal of policy makers is to minimize a loss 
function that combines deviations of GDP (or GDP growth) from trend and deviations of 
inflation from its target.
33    
 
(8)   
2 2 ) ~ ( ) ~ ( y y L t t - + - = l p p , and  0 > l . 
 
In equation (8) p ˆ and  y ˆ are the inflation target and potential output;  ) ˆ ( y yt -  is the output 
gap.  It is easy to show that in this case the only way in which the exchange rate could 
play a role in the monetary policy rule would be one where changes in e(or, in some 
models, changes in the nominal exchange rate) affect inflation and/or the output gap.  To 
the extent that the “pass-through” coefficient is different from zero, exchange rate 





.  If (some) changes in the real 
exchange rate reflect situations of misalignment they will affect the output gap.  Under 
these circumstances, the optimal policy will be one that takes into account the way in 
which exchange rate developments affect the two components of the loss function.  What 
is unclear, however, is whether the exchange rate should have an independent role in the 
monetary policy rule (8).  If the authorities have modeled the economy correctly – and in 
doing so, have incorporated the effects of eon pand  y -- there is no need to include an 
exchange rate term in equation (8).  This point has been made forcefully by De Gregorio, 
Tokman and Valdés (2005) in their discussion of Chile’s case.  If, however, there is a 
lagged response of both inflation and output to exchange rate changes, the central bank 
                                                 
33  Medina and Valdés (2002) develop a model where the authorities also target the current account.  They 
show that the optimal reaction function is significantly different from the traditional Taylor rules.   23 
may want to preempt their effect by adjusting the policy stance when the exchange rate 
change occurs, rather than when its effects on  p and y are manifested.   
Whether a pre-emptive strategy is preferred to one where the authorities actually 
wait untilp and  y begin to reflect the actual effects of a change in e is, in the final 
analysis, an empirical issue.  Moreover, it is a country specific issue; the main 
characteristics of a particular economy – including the dynamics of inflation, the size of 
the pass-through coefficient, and of different elasticities – will determine the extent of 
macroeconomic volatility – that is deviations of inflation and growth from targets and 
trends – is lower when  0 h and  1 h  are different from zero.  
IV.2  A Selective Review of the Literature  
Most analytical discussions on inflation targeting have implicitly assumed 
that 0 1 0 = = h h , without actually inquiring the way in which the incorporation of e into 
the policy rule will be affect welfare and/or macroeconomic performance.  In fact, things 
go even further: most discussions on IT in the mainstream literature have tended to ignore 
open economy issues.  In the important book The Inflation Targeting Debate edited by 
Ben Bernanke and Mike Woodford, the index has no entry for “devaluation” or “pass-
through”, and there is only one entry for “exchange rate.”  This corresponds to the paper 
by Jonas and Mishkin (2005) on IT in transition economies.  Most of the other papers in 
the volume – authored by influential economists such as Woodford, Bernanke, and Sims, 
among others – do not include explicit discussions on exchange rate behavior when 
dealing with monetary policy issues.  There are, however, a few exceptions: in their 
paper, Cecchetti and Kim (2005) have a section on an open economy, but do not ask 
formally whether  0 h and/or  1 h  should be equal to zero.  In his contribution to the 
Bernanke and Woodford volume, Mervyn King briefly notes that although the U.K. 
experienced a sharp currency appreciation (in excess of 20%) this had not affected the 
effectiveness of the IT-based policy.  Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2005) develop a 
model of an open economy where the exchange rate plays an important role during a 
“sudden stop” episode.  In their setting the exchange rate does play an important role in 
determining optimal monetary policy.     24 
The seminal book by Mike Woodford, Interest and Prices (2003), which provides 
firm analytical underpinnings for interest rate-based monetary policy, does not deal 
explicitly with exchange rates; the index has no entries for “exchange rate(s),” 
“devaluation,” or “pass-through.”  There is one entry for “open economy,” although no 
open economy model is presented, and the discussions on optimal policy rule do not 
consider the (potential) role of open economy variables.  (To be fair, however, one could 
interpret the discussion in section 2.1 of Chapter 7, on cost-push shocks, as including 
shocks stemming from exchange rate depreciation.) 
The pioneering book by Bernanke et al (1999) includes interesting discussions on 
the role played by exchange rates in monetary policy implementation in a number of 
countries.  The discussion of the Canadian case – where a Monetary Conditions Index 
(MCI) that includes the exchange rate has been used explicitly is particularly 
interesting.
34  However, the important chapter on “Design and Implementation,” (Chapter 
3) does not discuss at the analytical level whether exchange rate considerations should be 
explicitly incorporated into the policy rule in an inflation targeting setting.  In the chapter 
on Israel, Australia and Spain the authors discuss how Spain and Israel gradually relaxed 
exchange rate bands when they adopted IT, and they explain that in both of these 
countries the authorities decided “not to respond to short term exchange rate fluctuations” 
when making monetary policy decisions (Bernanke et al, 1999, page 205). 
Mishkin and Savastano (2001) provide one of the most complete discussions on 
the issue.  These authors convincingly argue that the discussion on macroeconomic 
stability in Latin America is not related to the selection of the exchange rate regime.  The 
issue is one of creating an institutional framework for conducting monetary policy in a 
credible way.  According to them IT provides such a framework.  Mishkin and Savastano 
develop a model where optimality implies a Taylor rule of the following form: 
 
(9)    t t t t e b y b b i 3 2
*
1 ) ( + + - + = p p p . 
 
                                                 
34   New Zealand also adopted a MCI in the late 1990s.   25 
t e is the log of the real exchange rate, expressed as deviations from its equilibrium value.  
The authors make a very important point: 
 
“[I]n Latin America exchange rate fluctuations are likely to have a bigger 
effect on aggregate demand and aggregate supply (because the pass-
through may be larger)…indicates that the weight of the exchange rate in 
the modified Taylor-rule,  3 b , may be relatively large.  However, this is in 
no way inconsistent with inflation targeting) (Mishkin and Savastano, 
2001, page 534). 
 
Ball (1999), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Svensson (2000) have argued that 
adding the exchange rate as an additional variable in equations of the type of (7) will 
result in more stable macroeconomic outcomes.  According to a simulation exercise 
undertaken by Svensson (1999, 2000) the optimal values of the exchange rate coefficients 
are  0 h = -0.45 and 
1 h = 0.45.  Ball (1999) analysis suggests that macroeconomic 
instability will be reduced if  0 h = -0.37 and 
1 h  = 0.17.  These results, however, are 
model-specific and they will change for different parameterizations.   
In a paper presented at a Central Bank of Chile conference, Taylor (2002) 
reviewed 19 recent models developed to analyze inflation and monetary issues.  Of these, 
only 5 assumed that the exchange rate affected aggregate demand, and only six assumed 
that exchange rate changes was a factor in the process of price determination.  This 
illustrates quite starkly the fact that many influential researchers continue to think in 
terms of closed economy monetary models.     
At the end of the road, whether  0 h and  1 h   should indeed be different from zero is 
a country-specific empirical question, that should be dealt with by analyzing country 
specific evidence – both historical and based on simulation exercises.  After much 
reflecting on this subject I find it difficult to disagree with Taylor (2001) when he 
expresses some skepticism on the general merits of adding the exchange rate into the 
interest rate equation.  This is for, at least, two reasons.  First, and as pointed out earlier, 
in properly specified models, the exchange rate already plays an indirect role through its   26 
effect on  t p and  t y ; second, adding the exchange rate (or any other asset price, for that 
matter) into the Taylor rule is likely to add considerable volatility to monetary policy.  
This conclusion is similar to that of Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) who provide an 
extensive discussion on the subject.  According to them, when implementing policy, 
central banks should consider the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on inflation and 
the output gap, but should not consider an independent role for  . t e  According to them, 
“targeting on an exchange rate is likely to worsen the performance of monetary policy.”    
IV.3  What do IT Central Banks Actually Do?  
The discussion presented above clearly indicates that the issue of whether 
monetary policy should react to the exchange rate is not fully resolved.  At the analytical 
level the answer is likely to be country specific and will depend on the structural 
characteristics of the country, and the authorities’ loss function.    
The vast majority of central banks, however, do not openly recognize that they 
explicitly take into account exchange rate developments when conducting monetary 
policy.   Indeed, if pressed, most IT central bankers would go as far a saying that since 
exchange rate changes tend to affect inflation, they play a role on monetary policy.  
However, they would be reluctant to acknowledge that the exchange rate plays a direct 
role of its own in the monetary policy rule itself.  That is, in terms of equation (7), the 
vast majority of IT central bankers would say that in their policy rules:  0 1 0 = = h h .   
As every student of monetary policy knows, however, in most countries there are 
divergences between what central banks say they do, and what central banks actually do.  
In a recent paper, Mohanty and Klau (2005) estimated monetary policy reaction functions 
(i.e. Taylor rules) for 13 emerging and transition economies, and found out that in eleven 
of them the coefficient of real exchange rate was significant.
35  This provides strong 
indication that, contrary to what they state, most IT central banks do take central bank 
developments into account when determining their monetary policy stance.  In Table 8 I 
                                                 
35   Other authors that have estimated central bank reaction functions to analyze whether the exchange rate 
plays a role include Hamermann (2005).    27 
present a list of the countries with the estimated short and long term coefficients in the 
estimated Taylor-rule reaction functions.
36   
The case of Chile is particularly interesting.  According to Mohanty and Klau 
(2005)  base estimates, Chile’s Taylor rule may be expressed as follows (t-statistics in 
parentheses): 
 
1 1 32 . 0 35 . 0 35 . 0 32 . 0 97 . 0 32 . 0 - - + D - D + + + = t t t t t t i xr xr y i p , 
                 (0.25)   (4.87)       (1.25)        (2.78)         (-2.40)            (4.03)   
 
where  xr D is the change in the real exchange rate.  The data are quarterly and the time 
period covered is from 1992 to 2002.   What is particularly interesting about the Chilean 
case is that the effect of (real) exchange rate changes on Central Bank policy appears to 
last only one quarter.  Indeed the sum of the coefficients for  t xr D and 1 - D t xr add up to zero.   
  As the results summarized in Table 8 show, there is a wide range of values for 
both the short run and long run estimated coefficients of the real exchange rate in these 
Taylor rule reaction functions.  (The short run is defined as the sum of the coefficients of 
t xr D and 1 - D t xr .  The long run is the sum of these two coefficients divided by one minus 
the coefficient of  . 1 - t y ).  Short run coefficients, for example, go from a relatively high 
0.79 for Mexico, all the way to zero for Chile; long run coefficients show an even larger 
dispersion.
37  In order to understand why in some countries monetary policy appears to 
have been more susceptible to exchange rate changes than I others, I estimated a number 
of cross country regressions.  The dependent variable is the short run exchange rate 
coefficient reported in Table 8.  The following controls were used: (a) average inflation 
1990-1995; (b) standard deviation of quarterly inflation 1990-1995; (c) standard 
deviation of the real exchange rate 1990-1995; (d) degree of openness of the economy 
measured as imports plus exports over GDP; (e) length of period for which the country 
has had floating rates; and (f) number of years since IT was adopted.  The results 
obtained for these six univariate regressions are presented in Table 9.  Since I only have 
                                                 
36  The coefficients in Table 7 have positive signs, since in this paper I have considered that a higher 
exchange rate represents depreciation.  In the Mohanty and Klau paper higher rate represents appreciation, 
and the coefficients are negative. 
37 In the case of long run coefficients, most of the very high values are the result of a very low estimate for 
the lagged interest rate.  This may be biasing the long run estimates.   28 
13 observations no attempt was made at running a multivariate regression with all the 
regressors.  In spite of the fact that the sample is extremely small, the results reported in 
Table 9 are interesting and suggestive.   Countries with history of higher inflation seem to 
have a higher coefficient for  xr D in their Taylor rules.  Also, countries that have 
historically had a more volatile (real) exchange rate seem to attach a higher coefficient to 
the exchange rate in their monetary rule.  When both variables are included in a bi-variate 
regression their coefficient are still positive and continue to have a relatively high level of 
significance.    
 
V.  Concluding Remarks 
The exchange rate is one of the most important macroeconomic variables in the 
emerging and transition countries.  It affects inflation, exports, imports and economic 
activity.  For decades the vast majority of emerging countries had rigid exchange rate 
regimes – either pegs (adjustable or hard) or managed.  This, however, has changed 
during the last few years, when an increasingly large number of countries have adopted 
flexible exchange rate regimes.  This move away from exchange rate rigidity has tended 
to take place at the same time as many countries have embraced inflation targeting as a 
way of conducting monetary policy.  The conjunction of IT and flexible rates has brought 
to the center of the discussion a host of new policy issues, including issues related to the 
role of the exchange rate in monetary policy, volatility and the relationship between 
exchange rate changes and inflation.   
In this paper I have addressed three of this issues:  (a) the relationship between the 
pass-through and the effectiveness of nominal exchange rates in IT regimes; (b) the 
effects of IT on exchange rate volatility; and (c) the role (or potential role) of exchange 
rate changes on the monetary rule in IT countries.   The main findings from this analysis 
may be summarized as follows:  (1) Countries that have adopted IT have experienced a 
declined in the pas-through from exchange rate changes to inflation.  In many of the 
countries in the sample this decline in the pass-through has been different from CPI 
inflation than for PPI inflation.  There is no evidence, however, of changes in the degree 
of effectiveness of the nominal exchange rate as a shock absorber.  (2)  The adoption of 
IT monetary policy procedures has not resulted in an increase in (nominal or real)   29 
exchange rate volatility.  However, in three out of five countries the adoption of a 
floating exchange rate regime increased the degree of volatility of exchange rates.   And 
(3), there is some evidence that IT countries with a history of high an unstable inflation 
tend to take into account explicitly developments in the nominal exchange rate when 
conducting monetary policy.  
   30 
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Figure 1: Chile, Alternative Measures of Real Exchange Rate
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Table 1 
Inflation Targeting: Selected Countries 
 
   
Country 
Inflation Targeting:  
Starting Date 
   
Australia  Apr-93 
Brazil  Jun-99 
Canada  Feb-91 
Chile  June-91, June-94 
Israel  Dec-91 
Korea  Jan-98 
Mexico  Jan-99 
  Source: Central Bank’s monetary policy reports and press releases;  
  Various Central Bank of Chile and IMF research papers.   34 
Table 2 
SUR Estimates: Exchange Pass-Through, Selected Countries 
(Quarterly Data: 1986.1-2005.1)  
 
                  Australia  Brazil  Canada  Chile  Israel  Korea  Mexico 
                                                              CPI  PPI  CPI  PPI  CPI  PPI  CPI  PPI  CPI  PPI  CPI  PPI  CPI  PPI 
                                                            dlog E  0.054  0.070  0.719  0.759  0.039  0.085  0.137  0.207  0.624  0.627  0.020  0.055  0.191  0.246 
  (2.34)  (1.31)  (24.76)  (22.30)  (0.79)  (0.79)  (2.88)  (2.08)  (12.18)  (5.95)  (1.20)  (2.10)  (4.85)  (5.98) 
                             
dlog P*  0.184  0.481  0.117  0.404  0.128  0.070  0.028  0.254  0.017  0.202  0.006  0.137  0.184  0.313 
  (3.13)  (3.65)  (0.22)  (1.66)  (2.69)  (0.66)  (0.26)  (1.10)  (0.18)  (1.54)  (0.07)  (0.88)  (0.64)  (1.29) 
                             
dlog P-1  0.548  0.060  0.300  0.284  0.499  0.404  0.355  0.194  0.132  0.121  0.200  0.213  0.635  0.584 
  (4.09)  (0.30)  (10.38)  (8.67)  (3.99)  (1.83)  (3.43)  (1.77)  (2.84)  (2.92)  (2.07)  (2.15)  (10.49)  (10.06) 
                             
C  0.006  0.011  0.011  -0.013  0.004  0.003  0.003  0.016  0.024  0.018  0.013  0.003  0.026  0.021 
  (2.27)  (2.51)  (0.55)  (0.54)  (2.75)  (1.24)  (3.88)  (1.66)  (4.78)  (4.33)  (4.59)  (0.94)  (1.96)  (1.79) 
                             
DIT* dlog E  -0.057  -0.054  -0.663  -0.524  -0.066  0.032  -0.132  -0.162  -0.427  -0.430  -0.031  -0.063  -0.176  -0.053 
  (1.55)  (0.60)  (4.95)  (3.28)  (1.20)  (0.28)  (2.27)  (1.32)  (5.23)  (6.42)  (0.43)  (0.77)  (1.05)  (0.31) 
                             
DIT* dlog P-1  -0.344  -0.011  0.866  0.379  -0.488  -0.054  -0.090  -0.120  0.120  -0.064  -0.097  -0.039  -0.454  -0.362 
  (1.76)  (0.05)  (1.51)  (1.41)  (2.77)  (0.19)  (0.79)  (0.66)  (0.92)  (0.54)  (0.43)  (0.51)  (2.02)  (1.74) 
                             
R
2  0.467  0.234  0.974  0.964  0.349  0.220  0.667  0.169  0.866  0.880  0.210  0.110  0.793  0.790 
Durbin-
Watson. 




-  4.85e-9  -  4.13e-6  -  1.49e-9  -  3.73e-8  -  2.98e-8  -  7.19e-9  -  5.23e-8 




























Absolute value of t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
E is nominal effective exchange rate, P* is the US producer price index, P-1 is one lag of domestic producer or consumer price index, and DIT is dummy for periods with inflation 
targeting.   35 
Table 3 
Short-Run and Long-Run Exchange Pass-Through, Selected Countries 
(Quarterly Data: 1986.1-2005.1) 
        CPI Equations  PPI Equations 
            Short-run pass thorough  Long-run pass thorough  Short-run pass thorough  Long-run pass thorough 
                    Pre-IT  Post-IT  Pre-IT  Post-IT  Pre-IT  Post-IT  Pre-IT  Post-IT 
                                   
Australia  0.054  0.000  0.120  0.000  0.070  0.070  0.070  0.070 
                 
Brazil  0.719  0.056  1.027  -
b  0.759  0.235  1.060  0.697 
                 
Canada  0.039
a  0.000  0.078





                 
Chile  0.137  0.005  0.212  0.008  0.207  0.045  0.257  0.056 
                 
Israel  0.624  0.197  0.718  -
b  0.627  0.197  0.713  0.224 
                 
Korea  0.020  0.020  0.025  0.025  0.055  0.055  0.070  0.070 
                 
Mexico  0.191  0.015  0.523  0.018  0.246  0.246  0.591  0.316 
                 
  Source: Author’s elaboration based on estimations reported in Table 2.  36 
Table 4 
Wald Tests for Cross Equation Restrictions 
(￿
2 with one degree of freedom) 
 
 
        Short-Run  Long-Run 
  Pre-IT  Post-IT  Pre-IT  Post-IT 
         
Australia  0.078  0.131  0.209  0.132 
  (0.78)  (0.72)  (0.65)  (0.72) 
Brazil  4.240*  3.966*  6.216*  0.543 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.46) 
Canada  0.189  11.189**  0.085  8.219* 
  (0.66)  (0.01)  (0.77)  (0.00) 
Chile  0.721  0.251  0.140  0.214 
  (0.39)  (0.61)  (0.71)  (0.64) 
Israel  0.007  0.010  0.025  0.523 
  (0.93)  (0.87)  (0.87)  (0.46) 
Korea  3.466**  0.030  2.840**  0.051 
  (0.05)  (0.91)  (0.09)  (0.92) 
Mexico  23.523*  14.846*  3.824*  6.235* 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.05)  (0.01) 
p-values in parenthesis 
* significant at 5% level 
** significant at 10% level   37 
 
Table 5 
3SLS Estimates: Exchange Pass-Through, Chile 
(Quarterly Data: 1988.1-2005.2) 
 
              CPI  PPI 
            dlog E-1  0.228  0.530 
  (1.55)  (2.21) 
     
dlog P-1  0.375  0.281 
  (2.53)  (1.62) 
     
dlog P*  -0.035  0.213 
  (0.26)  (0.72) 
     
C  0.024  0.000 
  (1.69)  (0.00) 
     
DIT* dlog E  -0.214  -0.446 
  (1.47)  (2.00) 
     
DIT* dlog P-1  -0.105  -0.189 
  (0.62)  (0.70) 
     
R
2  0.647  0.056 
Durbin-Watson  2.05  1.72 
Time period  88.1-05.2  88.1-05.2 
Determinant residual covariance  4.31e-0.8 
Absolute  value  of  t-statistics  is  reported  in  parentheses.  E  is  nominal 
effective exchange rate, P* is the US producer price index, P-1 is one lag of 
domestic producer or consumer price index, and DIT is dummy for periods 
with inflation targeting. Instruments: lagged first-difference of the US CPI, 
commodity price index, and first-difference of the US PPI. 
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Table 6 
GARCH Estimates: Inflation Targeting, Exchange Rate Regime,  
and Nominal Exchange Rate Volatility, Selected Countries 
(Monthly Data: 1988.1-2005.1) 
          Country  DIT  Float  DW  R
2 
         
Australia (1,1)  6.36e-06  -  1.96  0.10 
  (0.96)  -     
Brazil (2,2)  -0.001  0.0008  1.97  0.25 
  (4.16)  (2.55)     
Canada (1,1)  6.73e-06  -  1.89  0.04 
  (0.66)  -     
Chile (1,1)
a  -7.48e-06  1.71e-07  1.96  0.18 
  (1.70)  (3.57)     
Chile (1,1)
b  -1.57e-05  2.54e-05  1.94  0.22 
  (4.20)  (5.97)     
Israel (1,1)   -3.71e-04  3.94e-04  2.30  0.05 
  (5.44)  (3.92)     
Korea (1,0)  0.002  0.002  1.73  0.10 
  (0.94)  (0.95)     
Mexico (1,1)  -3.67e-04  2.1e-04  2.50  0.14 
  (1.06)  (0.63)     
Absolute value of z-statistics are reported in parentheses. DIT is a dummy for periods with inflation 
targeting, and Float is a dummy for periods with floating exchange rate. 
a Inflation targeting assumed to start on June, 1991. 
b Inflation targeting assumed to start on June, 1994. 
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Table 7 
GARCH Estimates: Inflation Targeting, Exchange Rate Regime, and Real Exchange  
Rate Volatility, Selected Countries 
(Monthly Data: 1988.1-2005.1) 
              Country  Mean Equation  GARCH  DIT  Float  DW  R
2 
             
Australia   AR(2)  (1,1)  -1.77e-06  -  1.96  0.07 
      (0.52)  -     
Canada   AR(3)  (1,3)  -3.67e-05  -  2.03  0.04 
      (1.11)  -     
Chile
a  AR(1)  (2,2)  -8.39e-06  2.50e-06  1.87  0.05 
      (1.27)  (4.02)     
Chile
b   AR(1)  (2,2)  -2.35e-05  4.66e-05  1.89  0.10 
      (2.57)  (4.22)     
Israel   AR(1)  (2,2)  -3.47e-05  7.05e-05  1.89  0.09 
      (1.43)  (1.75)     
             
Absolute value of z-statistics is reported in parentheses. DIT is a dummy for periods with inflation targeting, and Float 
is a dummy for periods with floating exchange rate. 
a Inflation targeting assumed to start on June, 1991. 
b Inflation targeting assumed to start on June, 1994.   40 
Table 8 
Interest Rate Response to Changes in Real Exchange Rate 
(Obtained from estimated Taylor-Rule Equations)  
      Country  Short term  Long term 
     
India  0.18  0.60 
Korea  0.29  0.67 
Philippines  0.09  0.13 
Taiwan  0.03  0.18 
Thailand  0.31  0.74 
     
Brazil  0.10  0.36 
Chile  0.00  0.00 
Mexico  0.79  1.58 
Peru  0.38  2.71 
     
Czech Republic  -0.03  -0.19 
Hungary  0.15  0.60 
Poland  0.05  0.20 
     
South Africa  0.12  6.00 
  Source: Mohanty and Klau (2005)   41 
Table 9 
Exchange Rate Coefficient in Taylor-Rule Equations and Country Characteristics 
(Ordinary Least Squares) 
                (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
              Average Inflation   0.015           
  (1.74)***           
St. Dev. Inflation     0.010         
    (0.71)         
St. Dev. Real Exchange Rate       0.040       
      (1.78)***       
Trade Openness        -0.001     
        (0.64)     
Length period with floating regime          -0.000   
          (0.11)   
Years since IT was adopted            0.005 
            (0.26) 
Constant  0.037  0.140  -0.031  0.276  0.207  0.170 
  (0.35)  (1.51)  (0.23)  (1.86)  (1.17)  (1.73) 
Observations  13  13  13  13  13  13 
R-squared  0.22  0.04  0.22  0.04  0.00  0.01 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses             
*** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%         
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